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LIVING DANGEROUSLY ON THE
*
DECONSTRUCTIVE EDGE
A Review of Dwelling on the Threshold by Allan Hutchinson.
Toronto: Carswell and London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1988.
Review by Alan Hunt"

I. THE DILEMMA OF PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUALS
The closing years of the twentieth century are proving to be
fraught with difficulties for progressive intellectuals. Contemporary
Western societies seem further than ever away from the major
structural transformations necessary for the dismantling of hierarchies
of class, gender, and race. It no longer seems relevant to repeat the
old battle cries of the variant forms of the socialist movement.
Despite the exciting chinks becoming visible in the monolith of the
communist East, orthodox Marxism, despite the intellectual if not
political renaissance ushered in by the Western Marxism of the
1960s, is simply too tarnished to provide contemporary inspiration.
But neither has the social democratic tradition been able to
transcend its bureaucratic and paternalistic legacy. The oppositional
Leftisms, whether Maoist, Trotskyist, or anarchist that have
occasionally surfaced over recent decades, seem ever less relevant to
confront the complexities of sustainable social change in the
contemporary world. Despite the commitment of progressive
intellectuals to strive for links between theory and practice,
meaningful engagement with where the people are at in relatively
affluent consumerist societies is more difficult than ever to realize.
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If progressive intellectuals in general confront these
intractable quandaries, a more specific set of dilemmas confront the
progressive working in and around the law. The intellectual
demography of the 60s and 70s resulted in a significant entry of
radical intellectuals into both legal practice and law schools. There
had, of course, been progressives working in the legal arena in
previous periods. The difference today is that the loose alliance of
progressives has achieved a certain critical mass which makes it
possible to entertain the aspiration that they might displace the elite
pageboys who have for so long and with such self-satisfaction served
the aggrandizement of law's empire.
We are the subjects of law's empire, liegemen to its methods and ideals.1

The most distinctive contemporary embodiment of this
aspiration to transcend liberal legalism and to found a critical
paradigm for legal practice and scholarship has been the critical legal
studies movement.2 It has sustained some degree of cohesion
around a shared project of slaying the dominant paradigm of liberal
legalism. But of late, it has found itself divided as to whether it is
either possible or desirable to generate an alternative critical
paradigm.3 Perhaps more significant than the fact of divergence is
that critical scholars have been uneasy about how to debate such
issues.
Thus, no sooner has an energetic and potentially
transformatory critical tradition been born than it has been
confronted by perplexing questions about what is involved in aspiring
to move beyond criticism of the dominant liberal tradition. It is into
this general and controversial terrain that Allan Hutchinson
1

Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1985).

2 For my assessment of the context and content of critical legal studies see Alan Hunt,
'The Theory of Critical Legal Studies" (1986) Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 1.

3 The first major expression of doubt about the project of generating an alternative
theory were voiced by Duncan Kennedy & Peter Gabel, "Roll Over Beethoven" (1984) Stan.
L. Rev. 1. For my own defence of the project of theory in critical legal studies [hereinafter
CLS], see Alan Hunt, 'The Critique of Law: What Is 'Critical' About Critical Legal Studies"
in P. Fitzpatrick & A- Hunt, eds, CriticalLegal Studies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
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intervenes. The essays (some new, some old, and some reworked),
collected together under the title Dwelling on the Threshold,4
although wideranging in their immediate subject matter, can be read,
I suggest, as advancing an answer to the question:
What is

progressive in legal scholarship? As will become apparent, I have
some substantive differences with Hutchinson's answer to that

question; but this should not be read as in any way detracting from
my warm enthusiasm for the fact that he has posed and grappled
with the central issues confronting the progressive project in law and
legal scholarship. It is around his engagement with these key issues
that this essay will concentrate its attention.
H. THE PROBLEM POSED: LIBERALISM'S FEAR
OF POLITICS
Hutchinson derives his formulation of the problems
confronting legal scholarship and practice directly from his critique
of liberal legalism. The centrepiece of his argument is to be found
in the essay "About Formalism" in which liberalism is encountered
in its formalist costume.
My ambition is to prise legal thought from the vice-like grip of this unfortunate
tendency [legal formalism] and to suggest other ways of thinking about and
performing the legal project.... The central thrust of my critique is to reveal its
theoretical untenability and political partiality. Throughout, I will insist that the
crime is not ideology, but the silence that hides it. 5

The untenability of legal formalism resides in its never-tobe-realized quest for some rational and objective grounding for the
decisions and choices that courts make. Legal reasoning strives to
rise above personal preferences to achieve some neutral resolution
to the Millean dilemma of the search for a means of choosing
4

Allan Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold. Cdtical Essays on Modem Legal Thought
(Toronto: Carswell and London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1988). If I may express a minor
irritation: it is unfortunate that the author did not provide information about date and place
of publication of originals or the sometimes complex re-editing and re-writing to which these
essays have been subjected. This absence made it more difficult to follow shifts and
developments in his thinking over the last few years.
5

lbid. at 26.

870

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26 NO. 4

between individual liberty and social interests; but in so doing, legal
formalism is blind to the fact that it can do no more than to give
effect to and to legitimate the established distribution of power
relations. Moreover, rather than achieving transcendental neutrality,
legal thinking is inescapably contingent. It will remain so because
the Enlightenment quest for some epistemological grounding of
Truth and Knowledge is unrealizable.
This general argument is illustrated in Hutchinson's discussion
of, amongst other things, administrative law when he insists that the
search for neutral principles which would allow judges to mediate,6
as if they were referees in a game governed by consensual rules,
between the private citizen and the state, involves ideological illusion
and self-deception. His discussion of the recent history of judicial
review, in particular the British cases arising from the victims of the
Thatcher axe, the Greater London Council and its "Fares Fair"
policy,7 demonstrate that at its best:
The evolution of legal doctrine comprises an unending series of fragile and
Legal discourse is nothing
makeshift compromises between contradictory ideals....
8
more than a stylised version of political discourse.

Hutchinson also uses these statutory interpretation cases to reject an
instrumentalist account of law as the agency of dominant economic
or political forces; rather,9 they are read as demonstrating the
"relative" autonomy of law. In similar terms, his analysis of the

6 The aspiration to achieve the neutrality of the referee is made explicit by Lawton Li.:
"Iregard myself as a referee, I can blow the whistle when the ball goes out of play; but when
the game restarts I must neither take part in it nor tell the players how to play." Laker
Airways Ltd v. Department of Trade [19771 2 W.L.R. 235 at 267.
7 See Bromley L.B.C. v. GreaterLondon Council [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62 and R v. London
Transport Executive; Ex pane GreaterLondon Council [1983] 2 All E.R. 262.
8Supra, note 4 at 91.
9
Whilst I agree with Hutchinson's general indictment of instrumentalism there is a
significant deficiency in his formulation. He seeks to encapsulate the relative autonomy thesis
with the metaphor 'The law is like a dog on a long leash". (Interestingly Norman Geras, in
his criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe's demonstration of the metaphorical inadequacy of
'relative autonomy', uses the analogy of being fastened by the ankle to a long chain; see "PostMarxism?" (1987) 163 New Left Rev. 40. The problem with these analogies is that they imply
that the leash/chain is fixed or held by identifiable social actors and that it is of fixed length
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contest between variants of the fault and no-fault liability principles
contingency of legal doctrine and its
in tort law points to both the
10
inescapably political nature.
If law and legal doctrine are congenitally political, then it
follows that there can be no other course of action than to embrace
the politics of law. Legal scholarship cannot avoid grappling with
the contending socio-economic and political commitments which
underpin the texts with which it deals. It is to that end that
Hutchinson advances his democratic alternative to formalism and
which I will consider in some detail in Section VI below. Liberal
legalism, according to Hutchinson, not only represses the political
dimension of law, but he also finds it guilty of suppressing "power"
and "history." The absence of consideration of the power relations

underlying legal relations is a corollary of liberal legalism's fear of
politics.
Hutchinson gives voice to a theme common in critical legal
scholarship in calling for the reinstatement of "history" in contrast to
the characteristic ahistoricism of liberal legalism. This position
manifests the close alliance that has developed between the critical
legal studies movement and the "new legal history."' - But much of
I have
the historical writing relied on by critical scholars particularly in mind the enormous influence of E.P. Thompson 1 2 -

such that the controlling hand is able to say "so far and no further." Presented in this form
'relative autonomy' remains nothing other than a sophisticated instrumentalism (implying a farsighted ruling class aware of the tactical advantage of a system of courts which does not
always hand down the decision dictated by its own immediate political interests) rather than
providing an alternative to it. The implication of my criticism of Hutchinson's version of
relative autonomy is that the question it purports to address, namely, the relationship between
political power and judicial power still lies unanswered on the table.
1

OSupra, note 4, c. 5 and 10.

11

This "alliance" is epitomised by the important role played of Morton Horwitz and
Robert Gordon for critical legal scholars. It is also worth recalling that much of the formative
CLS writing had a strong historical dimension; the early work of Duncan Kennedy, Mark
Tushnet, and Karl Kare was strongly historical. The positive evaluation of historical
scholarship is a continuing feature of CLS writing.
12 Thompson's Whligs and Hunters (London: Allen Lane, 1975) is perhaps the most
frequently cited historical text and rightly has had an enormous influence on critical legal
scholarship. Yet Thompson's historiography is generally incompatible with the "deconstructive
turn" favoured by Hutchinson. There is one possible link provided by Thompson's deployment
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emerges from an intellectual tradition which is by no means
necessarily compatible with the emphasis on contingency; writers like
Thompson and Horwitz are deeply imbued with the rationalism of
the Enlightenment tradition. Hutchinson avoids this difficulty by
primarily invoking the Foucauldian style of history, emphasizing
micro-politics and contingency, which sits much more comfortably
with his commitment to deconstruction! 3 Foucault is doubly
significant for Hutchinson because he paradigmatically embodies both
a postmodernist conception of history and a central preoccuption
with power.
III. THE DECONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE
The major thematic unity in this collection is provided by
Hutchinson's espousal of deconstruction. Before commenting on the
substantive version of deconstruction which he espouses, I want to
consider the reasons which he gives for going down this particular
path. His commitment to deconstruction stems from two main
sources: first, his acceptance of the postmodernist critique of the
Enlightenment. (Since so much of the case for deconstruction rests
upon its postmodernist presuppositions, I consider these intellectual
underpinnings in a separate section below (see Section V).) The
second source is the enthusiastic primacy which deconstruction
accords to language and textuality.
The linguistic turn has had far-reaching impact on legal
scholarship over the last decade. The "interpretation debate"

of the category "experience" to defeat the structuralism which has been his main theoretical
target; it is one of his least adequately developed concepts in that it seems to inject into
historiography a free-floating play of an unexplorable subjective consciousness. Thompson
himself is most unlikely to feel any more sympathy for deconstruction than he did for
structuralism.
13

1t is by no means clear that Foucault's development of the genealogical method entirely

succeeds in banishing the Enlightenment figures of "evolutionism" and "developmentalism."
There remains in place the troubling figure of "strategies." Even though he insists that they
are strategies without strategists, it is difficult to take this attempted escape too seriously since
the very notion of strategy implies the 'intentionality' of historical actors.
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continues with unabated enthusiasm. Hutchinson is concerned to
demonstrate that deconstruction offers a solution to the deficiencies
of liberalism which are reproduced within the interpretation debate.
In "Doing Interpretive Numbers," he demonstrates that both James
Boyd White and Stanley Fish replicate liberalism's sins of being
ahistorical and apolitical. Their works are respectively a "paean to
1 4 and "a profoundly conservative theory of
liberal legalism"
15
interpretation.
It is in Hutchinson's preoccupation to remain within the
"linguistic turn" whilst impelling it in a radical direction that I detect
problems. As I will argue, it is no simple matter to draft power,
politics, and ideology onto textual or discourse analysis; it is not that
I think it impossible, just that it is more difficult than Hutchinson
admits because as I hope to show, it involves grafting on to the
deconstructive project concepts from an incompatible theoretical
tradition.
I find myself most at odds with him in his strategy of striving
to outdo White and Fish by taking over from them a linguistic
determinism which further compounds the problem of how to
integrate power, politics, and ideology. Critical legal studies has
been much preoccupied with expunging all determinisms 1 6 It seems
unfortunate that a new determinism should make its appearance in
the guise of deconstruction.
The key passage which raises the problem of linguistic
determinism is worth quoting at length:
Language, thinking and being are inextricably linked. Our language is the raw
material from which our world and reality are forged; they are a cultural artifact
of the first order. Language is not a transparency through which we observe the
world nor a catalogue of labels to be attached to the appropriate contents of the

world. There is no form of pure communication that merely represents instead of
creating. The world is within the language and the language within the world....

14

Supra, note 4 at 141.

15

Supra, note 4 at 143.

16 The most rigorous critique of determinism from within the critical legal studies
movement is probably by Robert Gordon "Critical Legal Histories' (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev.

57.
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Language is not a system of static symbols, but is a form of social action. To
acquire and exercise language is to 7engage in the most profound of political acts:
to name the world is to control it.

In trying to unpack these formulations, the most important feature
is that alongside "language" there is another, but rather shadowy
presence, namely, "our world and reality." Now "reality" is generally
expunged by Hutchinson: he adopts a severe anti-realism. For
example, a few pages earlier he has insisted:
We must pull the curtain down on the melodramatic comedy of scientific manners
that presents the pursuit of truth as an attempt to achieve an ever closer
approximation to reality.1 8

If "the world" is not "reality," what is it that is not language but
which language "forges"? The passage quoted above offers the
possibility that it might be "social action" (elsewhere he refers to
"practices"). In other formulations, "history" is lined up amongst the
candidates.
We are worked upon and made by history and1 9language, yet, by our interaction with
them, we create language and shape history.

Again we have the invocation of a powerful, but still silent figure,
whose distinction from language is unspecified.
Hutchinson does not preach the absurdity that there is
nothing else but language. But in seeking, and here I am in full
agreement, to emphasize the importance of language, to reinstate
the cultural nature of sociality and intersubjectivity, he ends with an
overemphasis because that which is "other" than language melts into
the air. Thus, paradoxically he fails to make the radical break from
White and Fish which he is striving for.
Hutchinson is not alone in this dilemma; it arises very
distinctively in Foucault's work. Appearing alongside "discourses,"
Foucault refers on and off throughout his work to a shifting set of
concepts which are not reducible to discourse; variously "practices,"

17Supra, note 4 at 287-88.
18Supra, note 4 at 278.

19

Supra, note 4 at 147.
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"power," and "strategies" play this role.

But there is always

something unsatisfactory about these concepts. He refuses to reduce

"practices" to behaviour, but cannot identify its supplement. We are

unconvincingly invited to accept that there can be strategies without
strategists (because to admit the presence of the strategist would

allow back the banished figure of "the subject"). And finally we are
asked to accept that the compelling insistence that "power is
everywhere" compensates for an account of how it is other than
language/discourse. Hutchinson's problems are thus similar to
Foucault's: in elevating language he is unable to provide an
adequate conceptual framework within which the play and power of
language operates.
The problem with Hutchinson's thesis that "to name the
world is to control it" is that it implies an unlimited capacity in the
hands of those with the power to "name" to create the world in their

own image; it involves the same omnipotence of God in creating
man in his own image.2 0 Some means is needed to specify the limits
of "naming." Such an approach is indicated in Bourdieu's
formulation:
Nonetheless, the will to transform the world by transforming the words for naming
it ... can only succeed if the resulting prophecies, or creative evocation, are also, at
least in part, well-founded pre-visions, anticipatory descriptions. These visions only
call forth what they proclaim ... because they announce what is in the process of
They are not so much the midwives as the recording secretaries of
developing.
21
history.

I am not concerned to claim that Bourdieu solves the problem of
the specification of the limits of the power to name; I am concerned

20 The problem posed by the apparently unlimited power to "name " is but a larger
version of the same issue that arose with respect to the labelling theory of deviance in the 60s;
I have in mind work such as David Matza, Becoming Deviant (Englewood Cliffs NJ: PrenticeHall 1969). What limits are there to the 'labelling" or "naming" capacity of the powerful to
create the world as they will? One possible solution is that provided by Foucault's notion of
"resistances"; see Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980). But
this only tells us that power engenders resistance rather than aiding the specification of the
limits of the capacity to name.
21 Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Force of Law:
(1987) 38 Hastings L.J. 805 at 839-40.

Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field"
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merely to name the problem which leads Hutchinson into the perils
of linguistic determinism. His is not a "crude" determinism (there is
nothing but language), but a complex determinism which results from
the fragility of the supporting conceptual cast.
There is, I suggest, a very simple reason why both Foucault
and Hutchinson get into the difficulties they do. It is a consequence
of their philosophical anti-realism. However attractive it may be to
seek to escape from the dangerous water of epistemology and
ontology, on which the philosophy of the Enlightenment has been
continuously battering itself, the idea that there can be an escape by
abandoning the ship will remain forever illusory. To indicate some
"other" to which language/discourse relates is itself to presuppose an
ontology, and consequentially an epistemology, which have been
vetoed in the self-denying ordinances of postmodernism's nonphilosophical philosophy.
The consequences are more important than simply a return
to enduring philosophical problems which Hutchinson had hoped to
put behind him. There are real political implications. The most
serious of which is a reduction of all forms of social struggle to
linguistic struggles. Class struggle (and for that matter all other
forms of struggle) is reduced to the struggle to control meaning, to
a "hermeneutical struggle."
The struggle to control2 2meaning and, therefore, the conditions of collective life is
fought anew every day.
[L]anguage must be recognized as both the prize of political conflict and the arena
in which that conflict takes place ... It is at this stage 2that
the elemental struggle
3
to control meaning and, therefore, life is won and lost.

My concern is not that I wish to deny the struggle over
meaning; indeed I regard this as a core feature of the total process
which is helpfully grasped by Gramsci's concept of the struggle for
hegemony. My disagreement with Hutchinson is that "the elemental
struggle to control meaning" leaves no place for what most interests
me, namely, how the struggle over meaning is articulated with other
forms of struggle, particularly those revolving around material

22Supra, note 4 at 155.
23

Supra, note 4 at 148.
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interests. In summary, the linguistic turn as practiced by Hutchinson
has simply turned too far. In retreat from the old shibboleths of
economic determinisms, he has acted as if the only response was to
abandon the concepts of economic and material interests and has
imagined that language and the hermeneutic struggle embraced the
whole project of constructing a better world.
Deconstruction is the hegemonic form of postmodernism and
nowhere more so than in legal scholarship. As Hutchinson
makes
24
clear he is particularly indebted to Richard Rorty.
The Enlightenment Project is beyond repair and must be junked. 25

In particular this requires either that philosophy be abandoned or
philosophy itself must eschew any pretension to provide an
epistemologically secure foundation for knowledge, that Truth and
Knowledge conceived as the quest for objectivity and a
correspondence with Reality must be renounced. Since legal
formalism is deeply imbued with this rationalist credo of the
Enlightenment, it is irredeemable.
The alternative which Hutchinson adopts is to embrace the
radical implications of deconstruction conceived not as an alternative
philosophy but as a strategy for displacing traditional philosophy. It
is precisely because deconstruction refuses the status of philosophy
that it is difficult to give a direct answer to the question: What is
deconstruction? Rather it revels in its slipperiness; it delights in the
enigmatic and suggestively insightful phrase, but immediately denies
that its pronouncements can be dissected and roundly accuses
anyone who should want to do such a thing of being trapped in the
mythology of the Enlightenment.
Yet, accepting the risk of such charges being laid against me,
I will press the question: "What is deconstruction?" I do so for two
reasons: first because it is important to know what way of thinking
or method of study one is being asked to adopt and, second, we
need to know how to recognize good deconstructive practice when

24

See, in particular, R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979); and 77ze ConsequencesofPragmatism (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982).
25Supra, note 4 at 49.
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we encounter it; it is not sufficient to be referred in footnotes to the
master texts of Derrida or Foucault or any other exponent.
What follows is my attempt to answer the impermissible
question. Deconstruction is first and foremost a particular form of
Critique; that is, it starts out from the content of that which is to be
criticized. It is only concerned to a limited degree with the major
component of the methodology of critique, namely, with the
examination of the internal consistency and coherence of the ideas
it addresses. Rather, deconstruction starts by insisting that we treat
our object of inquiry as a text; this in turn leads to the substantive
project of exploring how the text is constructed. We are directed to
focus upon the components of that construction: these include the
linguistic style (for example the metaphors or other tropes employed
in the text), and the context in which the text is constructed. It is
in examining the context that deconstruction insists upon the
historicity of the text as a product of the play of relations of power.
This in turn leads to the contention that the truth or knowledge
claims of any text arepolitical expressions of the power play between
the text under consideration and other texts. These steps are, I
think, the bare-bones of deconstruction.
Before considering the implications of deconstruction for
legal scholarship, I want to pause to consider two other features that
are included in Hutchinson's account of deconstruction which I want
to suggest are problematic. First, his account includes the claim that
the "task of criticism [is] to note the meaning actually ascribed to
texts. 26 Here we encounter the problem of hermeneutics; whilst
there is often a close association between deconstruction and
hermeneutics, it does not follow that they can be automatically
conjoined since it is far from clear that the meanings ascribed to
texts by participants are necessarily a consequence of textuality
27
itself.

26Supra, note 4 at 39.
27 The relationship between hermeneutics and deconstruction is fully explored in H.
Dreyfus & P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Stiucturalisrn and Hermeneutics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1983). I agree with their thesis that Foucault recognised the
problematic connection between his project and hermeneutics but remain undecided as to
whether he solved the difficulty.
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The second problem concerns the relations between texts and
practices. Hutchinson includes in his account of deconstruction its
object as being to "draw out the social practices that the text reflects
and reworks."28 This task is only feasible with a very expanded
conception of textuality such that it embraces "practices"; intuitively
it seems important to hang on to a distinction between what people
But the real difficulty for
think/mean and what they do.
the
idea
of "reflection" since this
embedded
in
deconstruction is
inevitably takes us back to the philosophically forbidden thesis that
29
there is an independent "reality" which is mirrored in "thought."
These two problems touch on some "big" issues which I do not
propose to pursue further, but merely want to draw the moral that
it is more difficult for deconstruction to escape philosophical and
methodological issues than its "slippery" and enigmatic selfpresentation seeks to suggest.
From this consideration of the nature of the deconstructive
project, I return to consider the implications which Hutchinson
derives for legal thinking and practice. Most of the theses he
advances stem unproblematically from his account of deconstruction,
for example, that law and lawyering are political, "legal discourse is
only a stylised version of political discourse."30 Other of his theses

are not so self-evidently derived from the deconstructive method he
espouses. Two are of particular importance and I hasten to add that

it is not that I disagree with them, but rather that I am not
convinced that he can claim them as consistent with or as stemming
from deconstruction.
Tlhere is a deep logic and structure to law that broadly reflects the contradictory

3
relations of modem hierarchical society. [emphasis added]

My concern is to question whether Hutchinson's commitment to
28

Supra, note 4 at 39.

29 It is precisely this reality-thought connection which it is the main target of Rorty's
powerful critique of the imagery of thought as a mirror of nature (supra, note 15) and upon

which Hutchinson relies so heavily.
30Supra, note 4 at 40.
/bkid
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deconstruction allows him to invoke the three crucial concepts
emphasized in the above quote. Most versions of deconstruction,
and in particular that of Foucault, upon which Hutchinson relies
most heavily, regard all talk of structure as suspect since it refers
back to some reality outside discourse.32 I have already commented
above that to invoke "reflection" violates the deconstructive veto
against all talk of relations between reality and thought. 3 3 Finally,
the introduction of "contradiction" is problematic since it seems to
imply precisely the kind of dichotomized conceptions for which
liberalism and Enlightenment thought are criticized. Perhaps more
importantly, if contradiction means more than mere internal
incoherence, then it involves some idea that the features in
contradiction stand in some relationship to real processes or
structures external to the text. But this idea is incompatible with the
anti-realist epistemology on which deconstruction rests; it can only
be provided by some return (for example, to Hegel or Marx) to the
metatheories which deconstruction has set out to slay.
Similar problems surround his other major thesis:
All critique must recognise the operation of law as ideology. The Rule of Law
lends to existing social structures the appearance of legitimacy and inevitability 3 4

Again I have no hesitation in endorsing his thesis, but I challenge
whether it is consistent with a deconstructive strategy. There is a
widespread tendency to conflate "discourse" and "ideology" and I
suggest that Hutchinson is guilty of precisely this error. It is
particularly significant because of his avowed indebtedness to
Foucault. While the interpretation of Foucault's writing leaves room
for many versions, my reading of him is that he saw the project of
discourse analysis as markedly different from ideological analysis, and
that this was one of his significant breaks with Marxism in general

32 It may be that at this juncture in his argument Hutchinson is relying upon Alan Ryan,
Mandin and Deconstruction: A CriticalArticulation (Baltimore:

John Hopkins University

Press, 1982) (which he elsewhere acknowledges); Ryan's project is precisely directed at finding
some rapprochement between structuralism and deconstruction.
33

Supra, note 17.

34Supra, note 4 at 40.
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and the structuralism of his own earlier works. 35 So again the doubt
must be raised that Hutchinson may have debarred himself from
deploying the powerful analytic tool of ideology precisely because
that concept implies the existence of some connection between the
representations, discourses, and images which are constitutive of
social actors and some "real" or objective characteristics of the social
relations in which they participate. It is precisely this connection
which deconstruction disallows.
Let me take stock. The theses which Hutchinson appends
concerning structure, reflection, contradiction, and ideology are ones
that I am in agreement with. My point is that by jumping on the
deconstructive bandwagon, he has debarred himself from making use
of these important and powerful concepts. It may be that he is
guilty of trying to have his cake and eat it. If these concepts have
to be vetoed, then it gives point to the source of my anxiety about
the implications of deconstruction. Put briefly, my concern is that
the benefits that accrue from the espousal of deconstruction (and
these are not to be minimised) have to be bought at far too high a
price if these concepts have to be renounced.
It may be objected that this discussion of deconstruction is
flawed precisely because it is imposing the assumption, which
deconstruction denies, that it involves a methodology. My brief
rejoinder is that, like epistemology, there is no escape from
methodology. However, in deference to this objection, I will now
turn my attention to Hutchinson's deconstructive practice.
IV. DOING DECONSTRUCTIVE NUMBERS
Hutchinson's application of deconstructive practice involves
two stages: deconstructive criticism and reconstruction. The first of
these involves the strategies now made familiar through critical legal
35 The relationship between the concepts discourse and ideology is most fully discussed
by Mark Cousins & Athar Hussain, Michel Foucault (London: Macmillan, 1984). They

conclude that Foucault's later work must be understood as a "concerted attempt on his part
to steer the analysis of power away from the theme of ideology" (at 229). See also Diane
Macdonell, Theories of Discourse (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) c. 2.
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studies work in which bodies of legal doctrine are subjected to
interrogation through the examination of their deployment of
metaphors and other tropes. For example, he draws attention to the
heavy reliance in public law discourse upon the concept of
sovereignty; the transference of relations of sovereign/subject from
monarchical to democratic regimes is, as Foucault noted, significant
because the implied continuity masks the expansion and
consolidation of disciplinary power. The second element of critique,
even more familiar to readers of the critical legal theorists, is the
revelation of unstable dichotomous conceptualizations.
In
Hutchinson's analysis of the contest between the variants of fault
and no-fault liability in tort law, he demonstrates not only the
contingency of legal doctrine and its inherently political nature, but
the coexistence of mutually inconsistent principles.3 6 Deconstructive
criticism thereby undermines the metaphysics of legal rationality with
its claims to objectivity. His version of deconstructive practice does
not embrace all dimensions of critique. For example, neither
Hutchinson nor the critical legal theorists have focused on the
institutional
constraints
which
differentially 37 effect
the
operationalization of the coexisting legal principles.
The second stage of his deconstructive practice concerns the
objective of turning "the deconstructive urge into a reconstructive
impulse."38
He is at pains to head-off any suggestion that
deconstruction is negative or destructive.
Deconstruction need not lead to moral despair or political quietism:

it can be

incorporated within a mode3 9of political life that is organised in accordance with a
radical form of democracy.

36 The subject matter of the essays "Derek and Charles v. Anne and Martin" and "Beyond
No-Fault," supra, note 4 at c. 5 and 10.
37

One of the unremarked ways in which Foucault manifests some continuity with Marx
is the extent to which he was greatly preoccupied by the institutional context of discursive
formations. The neglect of this dimension of critique by Anglo-American deconstructionists
is to be explained by their almost complete preoccupation with language to the exclusion of
all else.
38Supra, note 4 at 264.
39
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I will postpone consideration of his conception of radical or "dialogic
democracy' 40 until Section VI below. The issue of democracy
receives less detailed attention than does the positive reading of
Foucault on which he seeks to ground his discussion.41 The main
implication of Hutchinson's use of Foucault is that it provides him
with the link between the linguistic preoccupations of deconstruction
and his concern to encompass the dimensions of power and politics
absent from liberal legalism. In his account of the Foucauldian
theory of power, he pays special attention to Foucault's emphasis
upon the positive or constitutive role of power and upon the
localization of power.42 What is, perhaps surprisingly, missing from
his account of Foucault is any exploration of his suggestion that law
constitutes a form of power/knowledge which is distinctive of
modernity43 ; despite the widespread interest in Foucault by critical
legal scholars, there has been little or no consideration of this
extremely interesting and potentially fruitful vein within Foucault's
work. Since so many of the issues and problems which I have
identified about the theory and practice of deconstruction revolve
around its roots in postmodernism, I now turn to consider the
underlying antiphilosophy upon which the deconstructive project
rests.

401bid at 265.
41

See "Working the Seam: Truth, Justice and the Foucault Way," supra, note 4 at 261-93.

42
For Foucault, the insistence that the only viable form of politics is 'local politics' was
one of his most significant and, I would contend, pessimistic reflections on the May 1968
events in France. I characterize this conclusion as pessimistic because it consisted of a simple
juxtaposition of local versus national politics. The primacy of "the local" was announced as
a revelation without noticing that in Italy, the C.P.I. had during the same period made
significant advances with a strategy which had sought to integrate very detailed 'local politics'
along with a national perspective. Hutchinson adopts Foucault's exclusive focus on local or
small-scale politics with little or no argumentation; see section VI below.

43

See, in particular, 'qwo Lectures" in Michel Foucault, PowerlKnowledge (Brighton:
Harvester Press, 1980) at 102-108.
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ENLIGHTENMENT:

Hutchinson's text. rests, as I have indicated, upon an
unargued acceptance of a Rortian version of the postmodernist
rejection of the Enlightenment project. It is therefore important to
explore the postmodernist view of the Enlightenment and the
consequences that stem from it. In doing so, I will touch upon large
and significant questions far beyond the aspirations of even the most
discursive review article. So, rather than attempt any full treatment
I will set up a contrast to Hutchinson's approach by presenting an
alternative view.
Rorty and the other theorists of post-modernism, 4 4 with their
critique of the false dichotomies of Enlightenment thought, present
us with an unhelpful and, I suggest, avoidable dichotomy between
the wholesale endorsement of the classical version of the
Enlightenment project and its complete abandonment. We are
presented with a stark and dramatic choice between the
Enlightenment (with the strong implication that to make this choice
would reveal our unreconstructed mind in its most old-fashioned
garb) or postmodernism (with the strong inference that this is the
up-to-date and radical choice); significantly no intermediate answers
are admissible.
Any approach which leaves anything of the
Enlightenment intact is but an attempt to keep that played-out
project alive.
It is important to note, in passing, that the
"Enlightenment Project" is always in the singular and thus assumed
to be a unitary and integrated project. The import or relevance of
the Enlightenment is confined to the past. Thus Rorty, less cavalier
than some of the European postmodernists, readily admits the
importance of the Enlightenment in displacing theological discourses,
but this recognition does nothing to hide the fact that the
Enlightenment has run its course.
Postmodernism embraces a complex set of ideas and I am
anxious to avoid committing the same error which I have just
accused its adherents of perpetrating, namely, that of suggesting a

441 have in mind particularly .- F. Lyotard, The Postnodern Condition (Manchester.
Manchester University Press, 1984).
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simple alternative between acceptance and rejection. Marshall
Berman succeeds in capturing the persistence of an intellectual
ambiguity towards the Enlightenment.
[F]rom Marx's and Dostoevsky's time to our own, it has been impossible to grasp
and embrace the modem world's potentialities without loathing and fighting against
45
some of its most palpable realities.

Berman goes on to make the very important point that whereas the
intellectual giants of the nineteenth century were simultaneously
enthusiasts for and enemies of modernity and wrestled with its
ambiguities and contradictions, their twentieth-century successors
have
lurched far more toward rigid polarities and flat totalizations. Modernity is either
embraced with a blind and uncritical enthusiasm, or else condemned with neoOlympian remoteness and contempt; in either case it is conceived as a closed
46
monolith.

I want to suggest that we can adopt a more dispassionate
view of the substance of postmodernism (and indeed retain many of
its insights and techniques) if we first separate its content from its
general intellectual outlook. At root, postmodernism is grounded in
a profound disenchantment with modernity. There is a very specific
reason why many progressive intellectuals have come to adopt this
disenchantment as their own; as I argued in the opening section,
none of the available political strategies of the present period seem
to offer much hope of foreseeable and radical social transformation.
So whether in disillusionment with the results of the May events in
1968 or with the swing to the Right since the late 70s, it is not
surprising that postmodernism has its attractions for progressives.
The implications go beyond mood, they effect style, I will argue that
the wider intellectual ramifications of postmodernism are at the root
of Hutchinson's political message that macro-politics are out and that
local politics is all that is available (see Section VI below), and it
also explains his concern to say things in new ways (see Section VII
below).
45

Marsliall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Eperience of Modernimy (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1982) at 14.
461bid at 24.
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I am anxious to hang on to Berman's sense of the ambiguity
of modernity. My own approach has its roots in an admixture of
reflections on Gramsci, Habermas, and Poulantzas. Whilst I
empathize with postmodernism's critique of instrumental reason,
scientism, and the cult of progress. I want to affirm that significant
projects, in particular, that of human emancipation through freedom,
From Edward
equality, and knowledge remain uncompleted.
Thompson, I derive the view that liberalism has lost the will and
inclination to pursue these goals, and that their realization has fallen
to contemporary socialism; this in turn underlines my view that
socialism must engage with and draw significantly from liberalism in
order to fulfil this objective.
I state these personal orientations in broad outline only in
order to indicate possible areas of disagreements since Hutchinson
himself does not advance any account or defence of the general
tenets of postmodernism. Its themes suffuse his writings. He does,
however, seek to defend postmodernism from some objections. In
particular, he takes on board the charge that postmodernism leads
by some inevitable and very slippery slope into the abyss of
relativism and, even worse, to nihilism. His line of defence is twofold. The first I entirely endorse when he rejects the politically
reactionary scare techniques which have recently been used against
who should know
the proponents of critical legal studies by people 47
McCarthyism.
intellectual
better than to resort to
His other major line of defence is to follow Rorty in claiming
that the charge of relativism/nihilism must be false because there
simply are no relativists or nihilists to be found on the block.
Nihilism is only threatening or comprehensible for those who maintain that objective
truth and rational knowledge are required for moral action and authority. It is only
troublesome to those who continue to believe in the worth of the enlightenment
project. The nihilistic deep is a construct of that project. If the Enlightenment
Project is abandoned, the association of nihilism with moral despair will also be

rejected. 48

47See in particular P. Carrington, "Of Law and the River" (1984) 34 J. Leg. Ed. 227;

Owen Fiss, "he Death of Law?" (1986) 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1; Alvin Rubin, "Does the Law
Matter? A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement' (1987) 37 J. Leg. Ed.
307.
48

Supra, note 4 at 46.
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Let me turn the argumentative techniques of postmodernism
against this defence. When he speaks of nihilism and relativism, he
does so in the same way that he does of Truth and Knowledge,
where the capitalization signifies "Absolute." In this sense, there are
no Relativists or Nihilists. But this does not make the issue of
uncapitalized "relativism" and "nihilism" go away. From the range of
philosophical and political issues involved, I will single out for
comment the problem of the grounds for evaluation. By what
means, if any, are we able to judge if one argument, policy, or
strategy is any better than another? I am happy to dispense with
any claims about whether one argument is "correct" or "right," but I
am passionately interested in which is "better." The postmodernist
credo rejects according any priority to particular strategies. In its
general hostility to deductive logic, it elevates narrative in a way that
makes other than aesthetic evaluation problematic. For example,
Rorty insists that philosophy can be nothing more than conversation
or more recently that
one can also think of philosophy in other ways - in particular, as a matter of telling

about why we talk as we do and how we might avoid continuing to
stories: stories
49
talk that way.

Whilst this has the merit in questioning the unique claims of any
particular philosophical genre, it leaves entirely to the play of
rhetoric the choice between contending arguments. Thus, for
example, my personal reaction was that I did not get as much from
those essays where Hutchinson adopted a narrative style as I did
from his more conventional essays.
My worry about postmodernist epistemology (or if it is
insisted that postmodernism denies the pertinence of epistemology,
then its anti-epistemology) is that it denies our capacity to ground
evaluative claims. More generally in rehearsing and reiterating the
Nietzchean assault on truth, logic, and objectivity, postmodernist
writers end up promising much but being held back in the
alternative they feel able to offer. Their texts are all too often like
dieting, they leave one with a lasting hunger - but perhaps this is
49

R. Rorty, "Philosophy Without Principles" in W.J.T. Mitchell, ed., Against Theory

(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985) at 135.
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just my hankering after the rich fare from the Enlightenment
kitchen.
VI. THE POLITICS OF LAW
After these reflections on postmodernism, it is time to return
to consider the programme for legal theory and legal practice which
Hutchinson derives from "doing deconstructive numbers." In the
essay under this title, he provides an extended critique of James
Boyd White's fascinating and wide ranging excursions into law and
literature. Hutchinson's conclusion is that White's work is ahistorical
and apolitical. One of the major reasons being that White, like
many contemporary theorists
has all but ignored the ideological dimensions of language even though all
interpretation assumes an entire
structure of values. The hard shell of language has
50
a soft ideological underbelly.

In other words, his diagnosis is that it is the absence of ideology
from White's interpretive analysis which leads to its questionable
politics. My rejoinder is that White is entirely consistent with the
interpretive approach and deconstruction in general; and this in turn
explains the politics that are the result. Whilst my politics are much
closer to Hutchinson's than to White's, the latter has the advantage
of consistency, whereas Hutchinson's radicalism is grafted onto
deconstruction. It is not that I hold that deconstruction is politically
negative; it is just that it can be employed any which way.
Hutchinson's progressive reconstruction of the politics of law
proceeds by starting with deconstruction and then supplementing it
with a few key additional concepts (ideology, power, et cetera). I
will argue that the general limitation of his political agenda, namely,
the failure to offer any linkage between "local" or micro-politics and
the wider structural location of politics within the state, stems
precisely from his adhesion to the self-imposed limitations of the
deconstructivist strategy. Let me hasten to add that I think the task
of providing the linkages between micro- and macro-politics is the
most difficult and pressing task of political strategy and further that
50Supra, note 4 at 134.
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the reader will look in vain for any answers to that problem in this
essay. I will be content to underline the claim that this is the
question and that deconstruction is an evasion of, rather than a
contribution to its solution.
Hutchinson derives his political stance directly from postmodernist theoretical premises.
By abandoning the search for foundational truths, we enhance the possibilities
for
51
the powerless to engage in the essential dialogue of world re-making.

Unfortunately he does not indicate just how the adoption of such an
abstract philosophical (or non-philosophical) position helps the
powerless. Indeed once it becomes clear that he conceives of
politics as "conversation" (here again the influence of Rorty) and
espouses "dialogic democracy 52 it becomes even less clear how this
helps the powerless even though he writes of conversational politics
with militant rhetoric.
[Als conversationalists, we are front-line
combatants in the daily struggle to resist,
53
reproduce or change the world.

54
He explicitly renounces the question of institutional change.
The focus of endeavour must be realigned.

Each person must individually and

collectively encourae5 themselves and others to promote and experience new forms
of inter-subjectivity.

It is difficult to conceive of how such a view of politics can provide
any challenge to the institutionalized structures of power and
inequality which characterize modern society. Whilst he recognizes
that in politics as conversation, the powerful have the cards stacked
in their favour, he is optimistic that localized politics can provide the
empowerment to activate the powerless. Local politics is more than
51

Ibid at 289.

52

1bid at 290.

53

1bid at 289.

54Ibid at 291.
55
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just a starting point; it requires the renunciation of politics at the
level of the state.
[W]e must refrain from the familiar attempt to think in total and global terms. The
level,
response must be much more local and domestic. By working at ground
56
transformative activity becomes a real possibility for disaffected citizens.

It follows directly from the Foucaldian thesis that power is
everywhere then politics is also everywhere. There is an obvious
sense in which this is true, but a more important sense in which it
is misleading since it fails to take account of the fact that local
politics are not autonomous realms, but that states, legal institutions,
political parties, et cetera, function to intervene in and to
hegemonize local struggles and resistances.
Hutchinson quite correctly accords significance to the wider
lessons that can be learnt from feminism for progressive politics. I
want to suggest that there are more important lessons than the
localization of politics which is the moral which he derives from
feminism. Not only has feminism opened up the whole arena of the
politics of gender and sexuality, but it has wider political significance.
Contemporary feminism was born out of the struggle against the
reduction of gender to class politics. 57 The resulting stress on the
specificity of sexual politics and, by extension, of other forms of
politics, and the consequent necessity for autonomy has made
feminism the most refreshing and innovative force in contemporary
politics.
But perhaps of greater importance is that feminism, or more
particularly socialist feminism, has begun to move beyond the

56

- bid
57

Feminism has not surprisingly entirely escaped the clutches of reductionism.

Indeed

it has produced its own internal reductionism in the form of radical feminism which has

sought to promote a form of essentialist reduction of gender politics to the essences of the
feminine and masculine. This essentialism takes a variety of forms. Mary O'Brien, for
example, reduces sexual politics to the politics of "biological reproduction" which is in conflict
with social reproduction; The Politics of Reproduction (London: Routledge, 1981). Carol
Gilligan's insight that boys and girls exhibit different forms of ethical thinking has been

erected into a counterposition of male/female thought without exploring the most obvious
inference that boys and girls learn, as we ourselves have done, to play their gendered roles;
In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Womens' Development (Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1982).
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celebration of specificity and autonomy to ask a whole series of
important questions: To what extent can specific politics (including
local politics) succeed without at the same time engaging with the
multifaceted forms of social oppression?
If struggles are not
reducible, under what conditions is it possible to go "beyond the
fragments" to achieve concerted action, and even alliances, effective
at the level of the state? These are questions which Hutchinson
needs to explore because without posing these issues he dooms the
powerless to forever engage in an endless series of single-issue
struggles. It is not that such struggles are unimportant; they are the
starting point of action and empowerment, but unless they find
appropriate forms of articulation at the national or international
level, they may remain locked into a vicious circle of a reformism
that can never achieve its most significant goals.
It follows from his commitment to local politics that he is
suspicious of, if not downright hostile to, institutional politics, and
this goes for legal politics as well. His strategic position is:
Resort to the courts can only be a pragmatic and occasional strategy for change.

58

This thesis is fleshed-out in the series of forceful and sharp
newspaper articles collected together as "Charter Cuttings" which
record his responses to the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. He is trenchant in his critique of the judicialization of
politics and of creeping judicial review of legislation which has come
with the first few years of Charterlitigation. Whilst his criticisms of
individual decisions is damning, he keeps open a small glimmer of
hope that the Charter may have some progressive potential, and it
is this glimmer that I want to explore. He poses the questions:
What should those committed to social justice and democracy do
about the Charter? His answer is "expose the peripheral nature of
the Charter" and do not waste too much energy or money in
mounting Charter litigation. But the third element of his reply is
more positive, if guarded.

58Supra, note 4 at 292.
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Charter litigation might 9be used as a platform from which to develop a more caring

and egalitarian society.

It is a pity that he does not explore these possibilities
further. I will content myself with outlining one way of approaching
this important issue by suggesting that it may be worth posing the
question in the following form: What sorts of issues and what types
of social movements might stand to benefit from a strategy which
gives some (not exclusive) priority to Charter litigation? In pursuit
of this question it would be useful to explore whether social
movements without institutional resources and mass membership
might benefit more as a paradoxical result of their inability to pursue
politics by other means. It might follow that whilst trade unions
would be well advised to abandon Charter idolatry, single issue
campaigns might fare better before the courts. Alternatively, it may
be the content of the political objectives of social movements that
is decisive. Those able to articulate their objectives within the
individualized rights paradigm of the Charterwould be likely to be
more successful than those movements concerned with social or
collective rights, not so readily expressible in terms of individual
rights.
I raise these issues because without some exploration of the
potential of legal strategies the type of position which Hutchinson
expresses comes dangerously close to a one dimensional negative
politics of law or, perhaps more accurately, the absence of a politics
of law.
VII. THE POLITICS OF STYLE
Hutchinson argues that new thinking requires a new style.
I have taken seriously the idea that in order to say different things about law, it is

necessary to say them differently as well. By jolting readers' traditional expectations
about the style and presentation of academic argument, the hope is that they will

59

Ibid at 227.
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become more sensitive
and
60
jurisprudential wisdom.

responsive to critical

challenges to

received

In pursuit of this objective, he experiments with a range of stylistic
genres. The reader encounters a one act play, snatches of sheet
music, poetry, cartoons, and a number of other devices. The
strength of this approach is that it makes the reader more conscious
of the author in contrast to the conventional academic disembodied
style which, with a rarefied conception of the pursuit of truth, does
its best to abolish the author. This it does by taken-for-granted
conventions which impose a third person style or forces the author
to employ the archaic royal plural "we."
In general, his concern with style is a product of his
sensitization at the hands of deconstruction to textuality and
language. However, it does lead him to make rather optimistic
assumptions about readers. To assume that to jolt the reader's
expectations is to engage their attention is probably unwarranted.
My more pessimistic judgment is that the "new style" of
postmodernist legal scholars is an immediate "give-away" and provides
an apparent excuse for unreconstructed legal academics to turn the
page in search of "some real law"!
Paradoxically, the effect of Hutchinson's concern with style
is to draw attention to the presence of authorial intent which sits
inconsistently with his commitment to a deconstructive method. But
perhaps a bigger problem is that it requires the author to be in firm
control of his styles. Hutchinson's command of conventional
academic style (which in fact predominates in this text) is polished;
he maintains clarity and lucidity. Most impressive is the chapter of
"Charter Cuttings" which reproduce, even down to the retention of
snaking columns, a set of articles written for popular newspapers on
the politics of the Canadian Chater of Rights and Freedoms. Here
he achieves what many professional intellectuals find so difficult; he
communicates complex issues in an accessible fashion with a laudable
clarity and directness.
I was rather less impressed by other of his stylistic
innovations.
"Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire" subjects

60Supra, note 4 at viii.
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Dworkin's text 61 to a series of film review styles. I enjoyed the read
and he captured the film review genre well, but I do have to report
that I have a rather hazy picture of the substance of Hutchinson's
critique of Dworkin than I would probably have had from a more
orthodox piece. "In Training" offers the reader a melange of a
playlet constructed of dialogue, sheet music, and academic style. In
"And Law," we are offered an allegorical anthropology. My personal
reaction was that I found these chapters contrived and less effective
vehicles than his more orthodox academic offerings. This may reflect
nothing more than that this reviewer is so inflexible in his
habituation to the academic style, that he cannot grasp the libratory
potential of such experimentation. On the other hand, it may be
that Hutchinson won't make as much impact as a playwright or as
a film reviewer as he will as a scholar and a journalist.
VIII. STEPPING BACK FROM THE EDGE
When Hutchinson conceives of his situation as "Dwelling on
the Threshold" of modem legal thought, his purpose is to carve out
a narrow, but hopefully secure, "ledge" from which it is possible to
avoid the twin evils of
succumbing to the secure comforts of traditional jurisprudence or straying too far
into the wilderness of political irrelevance.2

This laudable objective makes it more difficult to understand why the
intellectual rope with which he has sought to secure his position
should be that of deconstruction. Not only do I have doubts about
the safety of deconstruction as a life-line, but more puzzling is its
tendency to impede the general thrust of his work.
He identifies the connecting thread of these essays as
the basic belief that law and its study is inescapably political in scope
and substance. 63 My general contention has been that deconstruc-
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Supra, note 1.

62Supra, note 4 at viii.
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tion proves to be an unsatisfactory vehicle for the pursuit of an
objective which I share with him. Theoretically, deconstruction leads
him to have to graft on the concepts of politics, power and ideology;
and politically it leads to the insubstantial politics of localism. It is
as if rather than being a safety device, deconstruction becomes
entwined about his ankles Such that he is in constant danger of
loosing his footing - hence this reviewer's title suggestion that
Hutchinson is living dangerously on the deconstructive edge. My
suggestion is to step back from the deconstructive edge and to seek
firmer theoretical and political ground from which to conduct the
engagement with the post-liberal project of reuniting law and
politics.

